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1  Introduction
The relative wage of more-skilled to less-skilled Americans has been rising sharply since the
late 1970s.1  At the same time, within most industries relative labor demands have been shifting
toward the more skilled.2  Many economists have argued that these within-industry labor-demand
shifts are a primary cause of the rising skill premium, but there is still disagreement about what
caused the demand shifts.  They are consistent with skill-biased technological change (SBTC), as
many researchers have pointed out.  However, they are also consistent with explanations related to
international trade, and there remains uncertainty about which forces have contributed to skill
upgrading.  For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) find outsourcing to be correlated with
skill upgrading, whereas Autor, et al (1998) conclude outsourcing's effect is not robust to other
forces such as computerization.3
Most research has focused on trade and technology as demand shifters.  The focus on trade is
understandable because of the rapidly growing importance of trade in the U.S. economy.
However, foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) both into and out
of the United States has on many measures grown even more rapidly.  For example, from 1977 to
1994 U.S. manufacturing imports as a share of U.S. manufacturing shipments rose from 7.0
percent to 14.2 percent.  During the same period, foreign-affiliate manufacturing sales in the
United States as a share of U.S. manufacturing shipments rose from 5.6 percent to 17.3 percent.
This growth of foreign-owned manufacturing affiliate presence in the United States has
paralleled the rise in U.S. wage inequality.  Figure 1 shows the U.S. skill premium (measured as
the ratio of average annual wages of non-production workers to average annual wages of
production workers) and the share of foreign-owned affiliate employment in total U.S.
1  Several economists have documented this fall in terms of education, experience, and job classification. Bound and
Johnson (1992) find that between 1979 and 1988, the ratio of the average wage of a college graduate to the average wage of
a high school graduate rose by 15 percent. Davis (1992) finds that between 1979 and 1987, the ratio of weekly earnings of
males in their forties to weekly earnings of males in their twenties rose by 25 percent. For all U.S. manufacturing, we find
that between 1979 and 1994 the ratio of average annual wages of non-production workers to average annual wages of
production workers rose by 10 percent, from about 1.52 to 1.67.
2 Many studies have found that even though the relative wage of more-skilled workers has been rising, within most
industries relative employment of these workers has risen.  This evidence strongly suggests within-industry demand shifts.
3 The link between SBTC and overall wage inequality depends crucially on whether there is one aggregate output sector or
many.  In one-sector models SBTC always raises the skill premium, but in multi-sector models what usually matters is the
sector bias of technological change, not its factor bias.  See Haskel and Slaughter (1998).2
manufacturing employment from 1977 through 1994.  The skill premium rose from a low of about
1.52 in 1979 to nearly 1.67 in 1994.  At the same time, foreign affiliate employment rose from
about 3.7% of total U.S. manufacturing employment in 1977 to 13.5% in 1994 (absolute
employment nearly quadrupled over this period, from about 655,000 to over 2.3 million).  These
parallel trends suggest that rising affiliate presence may have contributed to economy-wide skill
upgrading and inequality.
In addition to Figure 1, several studies have found substantial differences between operating
characteristics of foreign-owned manufacturing plants in the United States compared both to plants
owned by U.S.-headquartered MNEs and to plants owned by purely domestic firms.  With plant-
level data for 1989 and 1990, Howenstine and Zeile (1994) find that foreign affiliates in the United
States are larger, more capital intensive, and pay higher wages than domestic plants.  Globerman,
Ries and Vertinsky (1994) find qualitatively identical results for foreign affiliates and domestically-
owned plants in Canada.  For U.S. manufacturing, Doms and Jensen (1996) report that foreign-
affiliate plants are more productive and pay higher wages than domestic plants even after
controlling for four-digit industry, state, plant age and plant size.4  All these studies suggest that
foreign affiliates may have quite different factor demands, even within the same industry.
Despite the evidence from plant–level studies and the time-series evidence of Figure 1, to our
knowledge there has been no systematic investigation into FDI and foreign affiliate presence as a
source of growing U.S. wage inequality.  In fact, Baldwin (1995, p.55) notes that “there do not
seem to be any studies of how the shifts in the pattern of U.S. direct investment and direct foreign
investment in the United States have affected relative wages.”5  In response, this paper examines
the impact of inward FDI flows and rising foreign-affiliate presence on U.S. skill upgrading in
manufacturing from 1977-1994.
4 Doms and Jensen (1996) proceed to group U.S. plants into three categories:  plants of U.S. multinational firms, plants of
large domestically-oriented firms, and plants of smaller firms.  They find that plants of U.S. multinational firms are the
most productive, largest, most capital-intensive, and pay the highest wages, closely followed by U.S. plants of foreign-
owned multinationals.  Thus, multinational orientation, rather than domestic orientation, is what seems to matter most for
these plant characteristics.
5 Slaughter (1999) looks at the effect of outward FDI on U.S. wage inequality.  Beyond this, a number of studies have
examined the impact of FDI on the general level of wages in the United States and other countries, including Aitken, et al,
(1996) and Feliciano and Lipsey (1998).3
To go beyond the aggregate evidence in Figure 1 and address the fact that skill upgrading has
been predominantly within industries, our econometric analysis uses variation across and within
industries.  There has been substantial variation across sectors in the within-industry changes in
foreign-affiliate presence.  For example, our data will show that across all sectors the average
1977-1994 change in the foreign-affiliate employment share was a rise of about 10 percentage
points -- but the standard deviation in this change was 14 percentage points.  To exploit this cross-
industry variation we create an industry-year panel data set for all U.S. manufacturing from 1977
to 1994 by merging data from the National Bureau of Economic Research's (NBER)
Manufacturing Productivity Database with data on inward foreign-owned affiliates.  Affiliate data
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (BEA); the
International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (ITA), and the Japan Economic
Institute (JEI).  Importantly, the MNE data all start around 1977 when the U.S. skill premium
began climbing.  With our data we employ an empirical framework used frequently in this literature
to examine whether foreign-owned affiliate activity affected within-industry skill upgrading.
In addition to examining overall affiliate activity, we have sufficient data to examine the
separate impact of different forms of FDI -- in particular, new plant (or “greenfield”) investment
versus acquired establishments.  This distinction may be important for a number of reasons.  For
example, acquired plants may be more likely than new plants to maintain factor demands similar to
those of domestic plants.  Alternatively, acquisitions may discipline inefficient firms to alter
inefficient factor demands (e.g., by reducing union power).  Our data also allow us to focus on
Japanese affiliates, which were particularly controversial over our sample period.
In addition to the literature on U.S. skill upgrading, our analysis also aims to contribute some
empirical evidence on the new class of MNE models in trade theory.  Until the mid-1980s standard
trade theory provided few explanations for capital flows into a capital-abundant country such as the
United States, besides tariff-jumping motives.6  During this time period, however, a less-
formalized MNE literature existed, centered around the “eclectic paradigm” of Dunning (1981),
6 While avoiding protection is certainly one possible explanation for some FDI into the United States during our time
period of analysis, few would argue that this was more than one of many causes.4
which emphasized firm-specific assets (such as technological assets) are important causes of
MNEs.  This literature also argued that MNEs are important channels for international technology
transfer.  This suggests that MNEs may bring into host new skill-intensive technologies that induce
or accelerate SBTC, even in advanced host countries like the United States.7
Beginning in the mid-1980s, researchers generated a number of new MNE models which
incorporated features from new trade theory and industrial organization (see the survey in
Markusen, 1995).  These models generate a rich set of MNE and trade patterns across countries
that depend on countries’ relative endowments and sizes, economies-of-scale effects, and trade and
investment policies.  These newer models have the potential to formalize the theoretical impact of
foreign-affiliate presence on skill upgrading and wage inequality even for an equilibrium like that
of the United States in which most of the inward FDI stock is owned by other industrialized
countries.  However, these models do not generate unambiguous predictions about the link from
inward FDI to skill upgrading.  They commonly show that inward FDI changes the activity mix of
a multinational firm between its home and host country.  This changes industry-level factor
demands--but both skill upgrading and its reverse are possible, depending on many variables that
are often difficult to quantify.  This ambiguity means the question of how FDI and foreign-affiliate
presence affect host-country within-industry factor demands is largely an empirical one.
To preview our results, we find little evidence that inward FDI has contributed to U.S. skill
upgrading within manufacturing industries.  The insignificant relationship between inward FDI and
skill upgrading is robust to several sensitivity checks including different measures of foreign-
affiliate presence, alternative specifications of our control regressors, various sub-samples of our
data, and focusing on different types of FDI such as greenfield plants versus acquired ones.  We
also present limited evidence that trade effects of foreign affiliates working through imported inputs
is unlikely to have had any impact on skill upgrading.  Thus, despite the plausible a priori
7 A recent paper by Adams (1998) finds that industries where foreign patents are more important pay a higher relative
skilled wage in the United States.  However, it is not clear whether this connection occurs directly because of transferred
skill-biased technology to foreign-owned affiliates in the United States or other more indirect channels, such as industry-
wide spillovers of skill-biased technology.5
relationship, we do not find significant U.S. expansion in foreign-affiliate activity to be a source of
U.S. skill upgrading.
However, we find one important exception: Japanese greenfield FDI.  We examine FDI by
Japanese firms specifically, since they were much more likely both to enter with greenfield
investments than other source countries and exhibit many differences in operating characteristics
relative to other foreign affiliates in the United States.  We find that greater Japanese greenfield
affiliate presence is significantly correlated with lower, not higher, relative demand for skilled
workers; greater Japanese presence through acquisitions has no significant effect.  The negative
correlation is consistent with recent MNE models in which foreign affiliates focus on activities less
skilled-labor-intensive than the activities of parents.  These findings also suggest that if inward FDI
brought new technologies into the United States, the induced technological change was not biased
towards skilled labor.
The paper has three additional sections.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical connections
between foreign affiliate presence and relative demands for skilled and unskilled labor.  Section 3
presents a brief set of facts about inward FDI, while section 4 presents econometric evidence on
inward FDI and U.S. labor-demand shifts.
2  Theoretical Motivation
Most previous work on the effect of FDI on wages has examined the issue from a general-
equilibrium trade model based on endowment-driven comparative advantage.  Feenstra and
Hanson (1996a;1996b;1997) develop a North-South model to examine the potential effects of FDI
inflows on wages in both the host and parent countries.  Here, a final good is produced from a
continuum of intermediate inputs which vary in the relative amounts of skilled and unskilled labor
required.  The South has a comparative advantage in unskilled labor.  This attracts FDI from the
North, which in turn transfers some number of "marginal" inputs from North production to South
production.  Interestingly, the skill premium rises in both the North and the South both regions
now produce a more skilled-labor-intensive mix of activities.  Empirically, Feenstra and Hanson
(1997) find substantial evidence that U.S. FDI into Mexico contributed to rising Mexican6
inequality.  Slaughter’s (1999) examination of U.S. MNE outsourcing follows Helpman’s (1984)
model of MNEs.  Helpman’s model is based on a two-good, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin trade
model.  Here, vertically-integrated MNEs may arise when relative-endowment differentials are so
large that trade alone cannot arbitrage international wage differentials.
Unfortunately, endowment-driven models cannot easily explain the recent wave of inward FDI
into the United States.  It seems unlikely that inward FDI into the United States has occurred
because comparative advantage has changed so that other countries are now outsourcing unskilled-
labor-intensive activities to the United States.  But if FDI into the United States is not motivated by
standard comparative advantage motivations, it is quite difficult to assess theoretically whether and
how this inward FDI should affect wages.
An alternative theoretical literature on the formation of MNEs is summarized by Markusen
(1995).  These general-equilibrium models start with the observation that a distinguishing
characteristic of MNEs is their firm-specific assets such as proprietary technology, marketing
skills, and management skills.  These assets have a within-firm public-goods aspect to them, so
they can be used across all firm plants after incurring a one-time development cost.  Thus, these
firms can realize economies of scale from multiple plants, which becomes important in a world
where there are trade costs.  In fact, introducing these types of features into a general-equilibrium
trade model leads to a very rich set of possible configurations of MNEs.
Markusen and Venables (1998) use this type of model to analyze the influence of MNEs on
relative wages in the parent and host countries.  They use a two-country, two-factor model in
which production in the monopolistically competitive sector is comprised of three distinct activities:
1) a firm-specific fixed cost using skilled labor, 2) a plant-level fixed cost using a mix of skilled
and unskilled labor, and 3) final production which uses only unskilled labor.  Intuitively, one can
think of the first activity as headquarter services for a multi-plant firm.  This means that branch-
plant activity is less skilled-labor intensive than both headquarter services and the MNE’s overall
operations.  In support of these assumptions, Carr, et al (1998) give empirical evidence that
foreign affiliates tend to be less skill-intensive and less-R&D-intensive than parents.  If a firm7
chooses not to service the foreign market through branch plant production, it remains a “national”
firm and exports to the foreign market.  Markusen and Venables assume that transportation of
exports requires only unskilled labor; this ensures that MNE plants with foreign branch production
are more-skilled intensive than exporting national plants.
Given this set-up Markusen and Venables show how relative wages are affected by various
parameter changes such as trade-cost declines or endowment growth.  In general, the wage effects
depend on the initial equilibrium and on the underlying parameter change.  For example, rising
trade costs generally raise the wage inequality in the skilled-labor abundant country as MNE firms
replace national firms, and lower wage inequality in the unskilled-labor abundant country.  But if
the countries are different enough in size to begin with, then wage inequality may rise in both
countries.  Another example is the wage effects of world endowment growth.  Growth leads to a
greater role for MNEs as they displace national firms, but the wage effects depend on the initial
equilibrium.  If initially there are many national firms and few MNEs, growth triggers a "regime
shift" away from national firms into mainly MNEs.  Since MNEs are more skilled-labor intensive
than national firms, relative wages go up in one or both countries.  However, if the initial
equilibrium has mainly MNEs, growth lowers the skill premium in both countries.  The intuition is
that growth leads to greater firm-scale effects.  Since skilled labor makes the firm-specific assets
with a public-good aspect to them, firm-scale effects with growth occur mainly with MNE
assembly operations which use only unskilled labor.
In summary, greater MNE activity can either raise or lower the skill-mix of activities performed
within industries, and thus help raise or lower wage inequality.  With respect to the recent U.S.
experience, then, there’s no clear theoretical prediction about the wage effects of rising inward FDI
unless one knows the initial equilibrium and the underlying parameter changes that are increasing
multinational activity.  This is not a criticism of recent MNE models.  They fill an important void in
our understanding of the real-world distribution of production and trade.  Instead, the ambiguities
highlight the need for empirical work to help inform which equilibrium states of the model seem
relevant.  In our concluding section, we address how our empirical results may serve this purpose.8
3  Data Description and Stylized Facts About Foreign-Affiliate Presence in the United States
To analyze inward FDI we combine the U.S. data from the NBER with FDI data from several
sources.  The Data Appendix describes all our data in detail.  The NBER data are a panel of 4-digit
SIC (revision 2) industry-year observations reporting the value, quantity, and price of output
produced and inputs hired within U.S. manufacturing.  We combined the NBER data with each of
our affiliate data sources, aggregating the NBER industries when necessary.
The BEA Data
Through responses to legally mandated surveys, the BEA tracks affiliates of foreign-
headquartered MNEs, each of which is defined as one foreign "parent" plus one or more U.S.
"affiliates."  A parent is an individual or a group such as a trust, corporation, or partnership which
controls a business enterprise incorporated abroad.  A U.S. affiliate is a business enterprise located
in the United States in which there exists "inward foreign direct investment."  In turn, inward FDI
is defined as direct or indirect ownership or control by a single parent of at least 10% of either the
voting power of an incorporated or unincorporated U.S. business enterprise.  For the years with
publicly available data, 1977 through 1994, we constructed a consistent data series for 56
industries, most of which are collections of three-digit SIC industries (see Appendix Table).
The BEA data show that foreign-affiliate activity has increased substantially during the period
of rising U.S. wage inequality.  Figure 1 showed this affiliate rise for employment as a share of
total U.S. manufacturing employment; Figure 2 presents the analogous trends for affiliate shares of
payroll, capital stock, and sales in U.S. manufacturing from 1977 to 1994.  All four shares show
an ongoing rise since 1977, with an acceleration in this rise from about 1987 through 1991.  We
note that the large rise in capital-stock share is at least partly a data artifact:  the total U.S. data
measure property, plant, and equipment (PPE) but the BEA data measure PPE plus all other assets
such as accounts receivable.  Unfortunately, the annual BEA data are not sufficiently detailed to
separate PPE from all affiliate assets in all years.8
8 In absolute numbers, total U.S. manufacturing affiliate activity increased from 1977 to 1994 as follows:  employment
rose from about 655,000 to over 2.3 million; payroll rose from about $11 billion to nearly $109 billion; assets rose from
$56 billion to nearly $548 billion; and sales rose from $60 billion to $580 billion.9
Because our analysis explores the impact of foreign-affiliate presence on within-industry skill
upgrading, it is important to note there is substantial cross-industry variation in foreign-affiliate
presence and growth.  As mentioned earlier, the average change in employment shares from 1977
through 1994 was 10 percentage points, but with a standard deviation over 14 percentage points.
The ITA Data
One limitation of the BEA data is they do not have disaggregated information on whether
foreign affiliates are born and/or expand via a merger or acquisition (M&A), a new "greenfield"
investment, or other types of transactions.9  As we discussed earlier, different types of FDI may
have very different effects on skill upgrading.  To allow us to explore this idea we use data from
the ITA.  Every year since 1974 the ITA has compiled a census of inward FDI transactions with
the following information for each transaction:  type of investment, foreign investor, U.S. state
location, 4-digit SIC industry, and (when available) the dollar value.
The ITA distinguishes seven transaction types:  M&A, new plants, joint ventures, plant
expansions, reinvested earnings, equity increases, and other.  In our analysis we do not use ITA
information on the last three categories both because they account for only a very small share of
total ITA observations and because they are fairly uninformative about the type of initial
investment.  Over our sample period of 1977 through 1994, of all remaining transactions 52%
were M&As, 26% were new plants, 13% were plant expansions, and 9% were joint ventures.10
Figure 3 plots annual counts for these two largest categories and their sum; the overall picture is
broadly consistent with the BEA trends in Figures 1 and 2.  Transaction counts peaked during the
second half of the 1980s, with M&A activity accounting for most of this surge.
Ideally we would use the ITA data to analyze whether different types of inward FDI have
different effects on skill upgrading.  However, these data have a number of disadvantages.  First,
the ITA generates data from publicly available media sources.  This is problematic both because not
9 BEA measures of foreign-affiliate activity by activity type are available annually for all manufacturing beginning in
1980.  Greater industry detail by activity type is generally not available due to BEA restrictions not to disclose proprietary
firm information.
10 What transactions data are available from the BEA also show M&As to be the largest transaction category.  Klein and
Rosengren (1994) note that from 1979 to 1991, this category accounted for from 60% to 89% of annual U.S. FDI inflows.10
all FDI transactions are publicly announced and because actual changes may end up differing from
announced changes.  Second, approximately one-third of the ITA observations do not list dollar
values.  Third, the ITA counts capture only gross flows into the U.S. affiliate stock:  they have no
information on exits.  Because of these concerns, in our econometric analysis we use these data
only in conjunction with the BEA data.  Specifically, we use the ITA counts to decompose changes
in the industry-level BEA measures of total affiliate activity among various affiliate types.  Below,
we discuss this data merge in greater detail.
The JEI Data
Our final inward FDI data source is the JEI census of Japanese affiliate plants.  Japanese plants
in particular are of interest because of the substantial Japanese FDI inflow during our sample
period which started from very low levels.  Additionally, Howenstine and Shannon (1996) find
substantial differences between Japanese and non-Japanese affiliates.  Japanese affiliates are much
more likely to be greenfield investments, to have a higher share of intermediate inputs in final
sales, and to pay slightly lower wages.  These findings suggest that Japanese plants may affect
U.S. skill upgrading differently than do non-Japanese plants.
Semi-annually from 1980 through 1990 the JEI collected the following information on every
Japanese manufacturing plant in the United States:  4-digit SIC industry, location, age,
employment, and M&A or greenfield status.  We measure total Japanese affiliate activity using the
JEI employment data; we also separate total employment between M&A and greenfield
employment.  Because of the difficulty in obtaining these data, we use data only from 1980 and
1990.11  Japanese employment grew by more than 400% during this decade, from around 57,000
to over 262,000, with these totals about evenly split between M&A and greenfield plants.  As with
the BEA data, the JEI data show substantial cross-industry variation in foreign-affiliate presence
and growth.  The average change in greenfield employment was plus 1700 with a standard
deviation over 5000; for M&A employment the average change was plus 1800 with a standard
deviation of 3000.  Among greenfield plants the largest growth occurred in Motor Vehicles &
11 We thank Keith Head and John Ries for providing the 1990 data in electronic form.11
Equipment (37,000), while among M&A plants it was Electronic Components (12,000).
Industries such as Agricultural Chemicals and Other Transportation Equipment actually lost
employees over the decade.
4 Estimation Strategy, Measurement, and Empirical Results
Estimation Strategy and Measurement
To identify the link between inward FDI and within-industry shifts in U.S. labor demand, we
exploit the variation in inward FDI across industries.  To proceed, we assume that in each industry
k capital is a quasi-fixed factor and that the industry minimizes the cost of skilled and unskilled
labor according to a translog cost function.12  In each industry cost minimization leads to an
equation explaining the level change over some time period in that industry's skilled-labor share of
the total wage bill:




Y)kt + b3Dlog(Y)kt + d(TD)t + ekt  ,
where k indexes industries; t indexes time; DSHkt is the level change in the skilled-labor share of
the total wage bill -- i.e., skill upgrading; wskt is the skilled wage; wukt is the unskilled wage; Kkt
is capital; Ykt is real value-added output; TDt is a full set of time dummy variables; and ekt is an
additive error term.  The wage regressor accounts for variation in SHkt due to industries
substituting away from more-expensive factors.  The coefficient b1 is positive or negative
depending on whether the cross-industry average elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor is below or above one.  The capital-to-output regressor accounts for variation in
SHkt due to capital investment.  A positive b2 indicates capital-skill complementarity whereby
investment stimulates skilled-labor demand.  The output regressor controls for industry scale.  The
time dummies control for any skill upgrading that is common to all industries.  Industry fixed
effects, accounted for through time-differencing the data, capture any industry-specific technology
differences that are common over time.
12 The advantage of the translog functional form is it imposes fewer restrictions on factor substitutability than either CES,
Cobb-Douglas, or Leontief production technologies.12
If one pools all industries and estimates equation (1), then the variation in SHkt not explained
by changes in wages, capital, and output is commonly attributed to SBTC.  Variations of equation
(1) have been used recently by a number of researchers.  Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994)
use equation (1) to document the large amount of within-industry SBTC in the United States in
recent decades.  Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), and Slaughter
(1999) expand this methodology by adding new regressors to equation (1), such as outsourcing,
computerization, and outward FDI.  These studies explain skill upgrading more thoroughly than
the assumption of equation (1) that any residual variation in SHkt is attributed by default to SBTC.
Our empirical specification adds to equation (1) measures of inward FDI activity.  Following
earlier findings that computerization is robustly correlated with skill upgrading, we also add
computer use to (1).  Thus, our baseline estimating equation is given by equation (2):




Y)kt + b3Dlog(Y)kt + gD(FDI)kt + h(COMP)kt + d(TD)t + ukt,
where FDIkt is some measure of inward FDI activity, COMPkt measures computer use, and ukt is
an additive error term.  The key question in equation (2) is the sign of g.  The null hypothesis is g =
0:  no relationship between affiliate activity and skill upgrading.  The alternative hypothesis is g >
0:  increases in affiliate activity are associated with greater skill upgrading.  A significantly positive
(negative) estimate of g will be interpreted as evidence that affiliates contributed to within-industry
shifts in demand towards more-skilled (less-skilled) workers.
Estimating equation (2) requires industry-level data on affiliate activity, computer use, capital
stocks, output, and employment and wages for both skilled and unskilled workers.  FDI sources
were discussed in Section 3; computer use comes from the U.S. Census of Manufactures, and all
other data come from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Data Base.  We measure COMPkt as
the share of computer investment in total investment.  Note that this variable enters (2) in levels,
not in changes, under the assumption that it is the flow of investment that creates changes in SHkt.
We construct SHkt as the nonproduction wage bill divided by total wage bill of production and
nonproduction workers.  We construct wskt (wukt) as total nonproduction (production) wage bill13
divided by total nonproduction (production) employment.  Kkt is measured as real equipment and
plant.  Value-added price deflators are not available, so we measure Ykt as real value of shipments.
Before presenting our results, we mention three general estimation issues.  First, all results are
robust to the exact treatment of the non-FDI regressors in equation (2).  Below we report results
for specifications which omit the wage regressor, disaggregate capital between plant and
equipment, and include real output and computer use.13  These results are qualitatively similar to
unreported results which include the wage regressor; aggregate plant and equipment; and omit
output or computer use.  Second, we use weighted least squares weighting industries by their
share of total manufacturing wage bill.  Third, all estimates use White-adjusted standard errors.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our key variables discussed so far; the various D(FDI)kt
regressors in Table 1 we define in turn below.  For consistency, all data are aggregated to the 56
BEA industries.  Skill upgrading is visible in the positive mean changes in SHkt.  Again, there is
substantial cross-industry variation in DSHkt that we aim to link with our D(FDI)kt  regressors.14
The Effect of Total Affiliate Activity on Skill Upgrading
We first measure affiliate activity (FDIkt) using the BEA data, our most complete data source
on all foreign-affiliate activity in the United States.  We construct the ratio of total affiliate activity
to total U.S. industry activity four ways:  in terms of employment, payroll, assets, or sales.
Rather than measuring the absolute level of affiliate activity, this construction scales how important
affiliates are relative to U.S. industry overall.  In principle, industry-years in which affiliate activity
constitutes a greater share of U.S. industry activity have greater scope for affiliates to affect U.S.
industry labor demand.  Accordingly, these industry-years have larger measures of FDIkt.
We use these BEA data across 56 industries from 1977 through 1994 to estimate equation (2).
Table 2 reports estimation results for one-year differences.  Each column reports estimates for one
of our FDIkt measures plus a common set of controls. The control regressors in Table 2 all have
13 The wage regressor is omitted because cross-sectional relative-wage variation might reflect skill-mix differences rather
than exogenous wage differences.  Standard trade theory with perfect interindustry factor mobility predicts no such cross-
sectional wage variation, in which case time fixed effects capture the truly exogenous wage changes.
14 We have data on COMPkt for only 1977, 1982, and 1987.  We imputed the 1977 level to years 1978-1981, the 1982
level to years 1983-1986, and the 1987 level to years 1988 and beyond.14
coefficient estimates in line with earlier studies:  skill upgrading is positively correlated with capital
intensity, output, and computer use.  While the fit of the equation and control regressors suggests a
reasonably specified equation, all four measures of affiliate activity have no significant correlation
with industry-wide skill upgrading.  Statistical significance aside, three of the four FDI measures
are actually negatively correlated with skill upgrading, suggesting that greater affiliate activity is
associated with reduced, not increased, skill upgrading.
We next conducted a number of sensitivity checks on the results in Table 2.  First, our
specification with one-year differences assumes that a given year's changes in affiliate activity
immediately influence industry-level skill upgrading in that same year.  This assumption might be
too restrictive.  For example, with M&A activity it may take considerable time for a new foreign
owner to change operations of a formerly domestic-owned operation.  If this is true, one-year
changes in affiliate shares may not capture the long-run impact of foreign affiliate presence on skill
upgrading very well.  Since most U.S. affiliates were originally "born" via acquisitions (versus
greenfield plants), this may be an important consideration.
To examine the potential long-run impact of foreign affiliates, Table 3 reports estimation results
for equation (2) where each industry is long-differenced over the period from 1977 to 1994.
Despite the change in specification we get qualitatively identical results to our sample with one-year
differences.  The control variables retain the correct signs and are generally statistically significant,
and overall the fit of the regressions is quite high for a cross section with so few observations.  Yet
we still find no significant correlation between any of the affiliate-activity measures and skill
upgrading.  Three of the four measures now show positive correlations, but none are even close to
statistical significance at standard confidence levels.
As a second check of our results in Table 2, Table 4 reports results for two different sub-
periods: 1977 through 1985 and 1986 through 1991.  The 1986-1991 sub-period is of particular
interest because during that time aggregate inward FDI into the United States surged to record
levels.  For brevity we only report estimates measuring affiliate activity in terms of employment;
the other three measures yielded no qualitative differences.  As Table 4 reports, using both short15
and long differences on both sub-periods we again find no clear link between affiliate activity and
skill upgrading.  In summary, our finding that overall affiliate activity has no significant impact on
skill upgrading in the U.S. manufacturing is surprisingly robust to a variety of specifications and
data sub-periods.
The Effect of Different Forms of Affiliate Activity on Skill Upgrading
To this point we have assumed that foreign affiliates in an industry are homogeneous.
However, the different forms of establishing a foreign-affiliate presence may have different
implications for skill upgrading.  For example, the acquisition of an existing domestic firm will
have no impact on industry skill upgrading unless and until the foreign parent changes the
affiliate's production technology in a way that affects the affiliate's relative labor demands.  This
contrasts with a new greenfield or joint-venture affiliate, which may immediately employ a much
different technology from that of domestically owned establishments in the industry.  Empirically,
Kogut and Chang (1991) and Blonigen (1997) find evidence consistent with a story where foreign
firms are accessing firm-specific assets, such as new technologies, through acquisition of U.S.
establishments.  To the extent that foreign acquisitions are motivated by these considerations, it’s
not clear that acquisition FDI necessarily changes the acquired establishments' operations.15
To examine how the effect of foreign-affiliate activity on skill upgrading may vary by type of
initial FDI, we construct a second set of FDIkt measures by combining our BEA data with the ITA
data that details FDI transactions by type.  To link these data we first aggregate the 4-digit SIC ITA
counts up to the 56 BEA industries.  Then we decompose the change in total foreign-affiliate
presence into four FDI types: M&A, greenfield, joint venture, and plant expansion.  That is, we
apportion the change in the BEA affiliate measures into the four FDI types using the shares of each
FDI type in the total ITA transaction counts for each industry in each year.  For one-year BEA
changes between years (t-1) and t we used ITA counts during year t.  For longer full-sample BEA
changes we accumulated ITA counts over the full sample period.
15 There is also an established literature on acquisitions as a disciplining device, whereby efficient firms acquire inefficient
ones.  This may have implications for skill upgrading.  However, if foreign firms are no more likely to be the acquiring firm
in these cases than U.S. firms, there is no expected effect from greater foreign presence in an industry on skill upgrading.16
Alternatively, we could simply use the counts of ITA transactions as our measures of yearly
changes in affiliate presence by type of FDI.  However, this approach would impose strict
assumptions on the data that are likely not satisfied.  This would assume that transactions across
type and industry are equal in size, i.e., that each transaction represent the same change in foreign-
affiliate presence.  A simple look at the ITA transactions for which dollar values are recorded
shows this is not the case:  there are systematic differences in transaction sizes across industries
and type.  M&A transactions, for example, tend to be much larger than all other types, so counts
alone would understate the importance of M&A transactions and overstate that of all other types.
By taking the BEA measure of affiliate-presence change for an industry and year and then
apportioning that change by type of FDI using the ITA data, we no longer assume that transactions
are equal in size across industries.  But we must still assume that transactions are identical in size
across types within an industry.  One important reason we turn to the JEI data on Japanese FDI in
the next section is because those data allow us to relax this assumption as well.
Table 5 reports results for the BEA-ITA measures of FDIkt by type for one-year differences.
For brevity, in Table 5 we report results using changes in foreign affiliate activity measured by
employment share only; the other measures (in terms of payroll, assets, or sales) yield qualitatively
identical results to those reported here.  As Table 5 shows, isolating the role of different transaction
types does not change the picture much.  There is no significant correlation between skill
upgrading and any particular type of inward FDI measures.  The same is true in Table 6, which
continues with the BEA-ITA data, but reports long-difference estimates.16
The Effect of Different Forms of Japanese Affiliate Activity on Skill Upgrading
As we noted, the ITA data don’t have information on transaction sizes, a limitation we can only
partially alleviate by linking the ITA data with the BEA data.  In contrast, the JEI data described in
Section 3 reports both size (in terms of employment) and type (M&A or greenfield) of all Japanese
affiliate activity in the United States.  So with these data we no longer need to make restrictive
16 Note that the non-FDI regressors in Tables 5 and 6 have nearly identical coefficient estimates and standard errors across
the different FDI regressors.  This suggests that the ITA allocations across transaction types are quite stable over time (e.g.,
M&A transactions account for about 50% of all transactions every year) such that the sample variation is quite similar
across the various BEA-ITA regressors.17
assumptions about the relative size of transactions, which reduces potentially serious bias from
measurement error.
In addition, a focus on Japan as a source country has the potential to yield more insight on the
potentially different effects on skill upgrading from M&A versus greenfield activity because Japan
had a much greater share of greenfield activity in the United States than most foreign countries.
Our JEI data show that Japanese investors had almost identical numbers of total employees in
greenfield affiliates and acquired affiliates in both 1980 and 1990.  This contrasts with Howenstine
and Shannon’s (1996) finding that other major source countries spent less than 10% of their total
U.S. FDI outlays on greenfield operations.
To use the JEI data as our third set of FDIkt measures we construct the share of Japanese
affiliate employment in total U.S. employment by industry-year.  We construct three different
shares:  of total Japanese affiliate activity, of acquired Japanese affiliate activity, and of greenfield
Japanese affiliate activity.17 These measures are similar to the BEA-only measure, as the ratios
allow us to scale how important affiliates are relative to overall U.S. industry.  We construct these
measures using JEI data for 1980 and 1990, and then estimate equation (2) separately on these
three measures for the ten-year difference over the 1980s.
Table 7 reports results using the JEI measures of FDIkt.  As with all previous specifications,
the control variables are estimated precisely and with correct sign, and the general fit of the
specification is quite high.  However, our results for our FDI measures differ markedly.  We now
estimate a significant negative correlation with U.S. industry-wide skill upgrading for changes in
new-plant Japanese affiliate employment; this also shows up to a lesser degree for changes in all
Japanese activity.  This suggests that greater Japanese inward FDI decreased, rather than
increased, skill upgrading within U.S. manufacturing industries over this time period.  These
results are estimated from JEI data aggregated up to our 56 BEA industries.  We obtain
qualitatively identical results when we alternatively estimate equation (2) using the JEI measures of
17 Greenfield activity includes establishments that may be joint ventures with more than one Japanese firm, or between a
Japanese firm and another foreign or U.S.-based partner.18
FDI at their original 4-digit SIC industry level.  Results are also robust to alternative specifications
of the controls and specifications which include both M&A and greenfield regressors separately.
A closer look at the data underlying these regressions finds a few outlier industries.  Motor
vehicles and equipment had the single largest level rise in greenfield share of industry employment
(DFDIkt = +.053), yet this industry was one of the few with a decline in the skilled-labor share of
the wage bill (DSHkt = -.013).  This observation squares with anecdotal evidence that Japanese
FDI in this industry, largely thought to be "VER jumping," focused on relatively unskill-intensive
assembly activities.  Similar to cars, rubber products had one of the largest rises in greenfield share
(DFDIkt = +.017) combined with the single largest decline in wagebill share (DSHkt = -.026).
Conversely, the communications-products industry had a relatively small rise in greenfield
employment share (DFDIkt = +.007) but the single largest rise in wagebill share (DSHkt = +.141).
These three industries in particular help drive the major finding of Table 7.  However, our
sensitivity checks showed this finding to be robust to excluding outliers such as these.
Discussion of Empirical Results and Conclusions
Our results suggest zero or even a negative correlation between increases in foreign-affiliate
activity and skill upgrading in the United States from 1977 through 1994.  That is, skill upgrading
within U.S. manufacturing industries is not positively correlated with greater foreign-affiliate
activity.  This suggests that foreign affiliates have not been an important source of SBTC, contrary
to any anecdotal evidence.  This eliminates one possible force behind SBTC that until now has not
been systematically explored.
One concern we had about our results was that three of our four measures of affiliate activity
capture part of value added (either labor or capital), while our fourth (sales) encompasses both
value added and intermediate inputs.  These measures might miss important affiliate effects on skill
upgrading working through just intermediate inputs.  There is reason to suspect that a role for input
activity in particular.  First, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) find a strong correlation between skill
upgrading and a rising share of imports in total U.S. intermediate-input purchases.  Second, Zeile
(1998) shows that on average, affiliates rely on imported intermediate inputs to a much greater19
degree than do domestically owned companies.  Together, these two facts suggest that the rising
share of imported intermediate inputs found by Feenstra and Hanson might be caused by the
increased presence of foreign affiliates.
Unfortunately, the publicly available BEA data do not contain sufficiently detailed information
on affiliate intermediate-input purchases to test this idea as formally as our earlier regressions.
However, what little data are available on this question suggest that affiliate input purchases did not
play an important role.  For example, 1977 to 1989 saw extensive skill upgrading in the majority
of U.S. industries.  Yet over this period the share of imports in total manufacturing-wide affiliate
input purchases held constant at 16%.  The share rose only slightly in only two of the five broad
industries for which the BEA breaks out the manufacturing totals:  chemicals (from 9% to 12%)
and other manufacturing (from 15% to 17%).  From 1989 to 1994 the all-manufacturing share rose
up to nearly 19%, but during this time U.S. skill upgrading slowed considerably.  We do not have
the data to explore cross-industry patterns, but these aggregate data do not indicate a strong link
between U.S. skill upgrading and rising affiliate imports of inputs.
Our results using the Japanese data are intriguing.  Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle
whether the significant negative correlation between greenfield affiliate activity and skill upgrading
is because the JEI data have more accurate measures of greenfield activity or because the JEI data
are picking up an effect specific to differences in Japanese investors from those in other source
countries.  In some respects, our overall conclusions are not affected by which explanation
matters.  Suppose greenfield activity across all source countries has a different impact on skill
upgrading relative to other affiliate types, but we are just not able to measure this precisely using
the ITA counts.  The overall impact of total foreign affiliate activity is still likely negligible because
the vast amount of activity for source countries other than Japan is M&A activity which shows no
impact even in the Japanese data.  If the negative correlation between Japanese greenfield activity
and skill upgrading is specific to Japan only, then the overall impact must be even smaller.
The negative correlation between greenfield activity and skill upgrading has relevance beyond
the skill-upgrading literature.  The result lends empirical support to recent models of MNEs in20
which foreign affiliates focus on activities less skilled-labor intensive than the activities of MNE
parents.  In these models parents are skill-intensive relative to affiliates because only parents
perform firm-wide skill-intensive activities such as R&D and advertising.  In U.S. manufacturing,
parents of U.S. MNEs account for at least 50% of activity in terms of employment and sales (see
Slaughter, 1999).  So "on average" U.S. industries look like parents, in which case foreign-
affiliate expansion into the United States should tend to reduce the skill mix of U.S. industries--a
prediction that squares with our empirical findings.  Thus, we think our findings provide some of
the first empirical support for some aspects of this newer class of MNE models.
Finally, our findings also highlight a possible issue for future theory work:  differences
between types of FDI.  We find significant effects of inward FDI on U.S. labor demands only for
greenfield activity, not M&A activity.  To date, the type of FDI has received relatively little
attention in MNE models.  Our results indicate that FDI type might be an important factor in
determining host-country labor-market effects.21
Data Appendix
BEA Data
Under the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act, MNEs are obligated to
participate in BEA censuses and surveys.  In 1987 and 1992 the BEA conducted censuses of every
U.S. business enterprise that was a U.S. affiliate of a foreign person.  In the intervening years from
1977 through 1994 the BEA surveyed a subset of all U.S. affiliates and then estimated universe totals.
The censuses (also called "benchmark surveys") sample every American affiliate identified both by
checking whether each affiliate from the previous census has "died" and by monitoring news services
for the "birth" of new affiliates since that census.  Substantive data must be reported by only those
affiliates whose total assets, sales, or net income/loss exceeds $1 million.18  The surveys sample larger
U.S. affiliates in existence for the most recent benchmark survey.  To generate universe estimates
from these surveys, the BEA calculates activity growth rates for sampled affiliates and then assumes
the same growth rates for all affiliates.  Data are required to be reported on a fiscal-year basis
following generally accepted U.S. accounting principles.  In particular, monetary amounts must be
reported in U.S. dollars.  The BEA defines parents and affiliates as described in the text.  When there
is more than one ownership link between the parent and affiliate, the percentages of ownership for
each link are determined and then multiplied to determine the parent's overall stake in the affiliate.
To classify the activity of affiliates in its publicly available data, the BEA assigns each to a single
industry that accounts for the largest share of its total activity.19  From 1977 through 1986 the BEA
classified industries using the Direct Investment (DI) classification, adapted directly from SIC revision
2 (1972) industry codes.  Starting in 1987 the BEA switched to the International Surveys Industry
(ISI) classification, based on the SIC revision 3 (1987) industry codes.  We concorded the ISI data
back to the DI classifications by following both an internal BEA concordance plus an SIC revision 2 -
revision 3 concordance accompanying the NBER data base.  This concordance left us with 56 BEA
manufacturing industries.  Some are individual three-digit SIC industries; others are the sum of
several three-digit SIC industries; and a few are single two-digit SIC industries.  For our analysis we
aggregated the NBER data up to these 56 industries.
Sales are defined as gross sales minus returns, allowances, and discounts.  Employment is defined
as the number of full and part-time employees on the payroll either at fiscal-year end or at some
representative time during the year.  Compensation is defined as wages, salaries, payments-in-kind,
and employee benefit plans.  Total Assets are defined as current assets (e.g., accounts receivable) plus
non-current assets (e.g., gross plant, property, and equipment).
ITA Data
As reported in the text, each year since 1974, the International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce (ITA) reports a list of the year’s FDI transactions, including the type of
investment, the foreign investor and country, the four-digit SIC of the U.S. investment, the U.S. state
location, and the dollar value of the transaction when available.  These transactions are classified by
type of investment 1) acquisitions and mergers, 2) new plants, 3) joint ventures, 4) plant expansions,
5) reinvested earnings, 6) equity increases, and 7) other.  These data represent a compilation of
material from generally publicly available sources, including newspapers, business and trade journals,
as well as from Federal regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal
Trade Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.  While this means that the universe of FDI
18 Affiliates not meeting this criterion account for negligible amounts of activity:  in 1992 they accounted for only about
1% of total affiliate assets, sales, and net employment.  The data reported in censuses as covering "all U.S. affiliates"
actually refers to only those affiliates meeting this size criterion.
19 This classification follows a three-step procedure. First, the parent or affiliate is classified in the one-digit industry that
accounts for the largest percentage of its sales.  Second, within that one-digit industry it is classified in the two-digit
industry that accounts for the largest percentage of its sales.  Third, within that two-digit industry it is classified in the
three-digit industry that accounts for the largest percentage of its sales.22
transactions in the United States are not accounted for in the data, the ITA and others have found
they track the BEA data reasonably well.
This paper uses counts of FDI occurrences (by transaction type and 4-digit SIC) listed in the ITA
data for the years 1977 through 1994.  To concord counts of transactions listed in the ITA database
to our 56 BEA sectors, a number of data issues were addressed.   First, for reasons cited in the text, we
eliminated observations classified as reinvested earnings, equity increases, or “other.”  Second,
counts recorded from 1988 through 1994 are recorded using revision 3 of the SIC and were
concorded into revision 2 of the SIC.  Next, a small fraction of the counts (approximately one
hundred observations out of more than five thousand) had no record of the type of transaction.  For
these observations, we simply distributed a transaction across the 4 types according to their average
distribution for the sample: 1) 52% to AM, 2) 9% to JV, 3) 26% to NP, and 4) 13% to PE.  There
were an additional twelve observations with no type recorded and which were only listed at a 2-digit
SIC.  For these observations,  we distributed across type (by distribution above) and equally across the
first 4-digit codes within the corresponding 3-digit sectors.  For example, if the observation listed a
transaction in SIC 28, we distributed equally into SIC 2812, 2821, 2831, 2841, 2851, 2861, 2873,
2891.  There were approximately 50 observations that had type of transaction specified, but were
only listed at a 2-digit or 3-digit SIC code.  For the 2-digit SIC observations, we used the same
procedure to distribute the specified transaction equally across the first 4-digit codes within the
corresponding 3-digit sectors.  For the 3-digit observations, we distributed the transaction equally
across all 4-digit SIC in the corresponding 3-digit industry.  Finally, there were a handful of
transactions (less than ten) that were deleted because of recorded SICs in the ITA data that do not
exist - i.e., coding problems.  Once these data steps were taken, we concorded the 4-digit SIC
industries (revision 2) into the 56 BEA sectors we use for the paper’s empirical analysis.
JEI Data
Our data on Japanese manufacturing affiliate presence in the United States comes from survey
data of Japanese plants in the United States conducted by the Japan Economic Institute (JEI) and
published semi-annually from 1980 through 1990 by JEI in Japan’s Expanding U.S. Manufacturing
Presence. The appendix of this report lists all Japanese plants in the United States and includes
information on 4-digit SIC (revision 3), location of U.S. plant, plant-level employees, year of
establishment, and whether the plant was acquired or greenfield investment.
Keith Head and John Ries provided us with an electronic form of the 1990 update, the final year
published by JEI.  After eliminating observations for which Japanese ownership was less than a fifty
percent share, we concorded the 1990 employee levels (listed separately by greenfield or acquisition)
into revision 2 of the SIC and then into the 56 BEA sectors.  Construction of the 1980 employee
levels was more problematic.  We created an electronic form of the 1980 survey and eliminated plants
with Japanese ownership less than fifty percent share.  We noticed that there were 1990 plants with
establishment dates of 1980 or earlier, for which there was no record  in the 1980 survey.  These were
plants that were presumably missed in the initial 1980 survey.  A number of these plants appear in the
1981, 1983, or 1984 updates, and so we assumed the employee numbers in these updates were the
same as 1980 levels.  A smaller number of observations on 1980 plants did not have records until
surveys or updates after 1986.  For these we first calculated the average growth from 1980 to 1990
for all plants for which we had employee numbers in our sample.  The average growth rate was 9.4%
over the 10 years.   A simple interpolation implies growth of 5.6% from 1980 to 1986.  We used
these growth rates to get 1980 employee levels from 1986 and 1990 employee levels.  Finally, there
were a small number of observations which had no employees listed in 1980 and also did not show
up in later surveys.  We imputed 1980 employee numbers for these plants by taking the average 1980
employees for other plants in the same 4-digit SIC or, if necessary, the same 3-digit SIC.  In the end,
about one-eighth of our observations in 1980 had employee levels estimated in some manner
described above, because we didn’t have information on 1980 employee levels directly from the
1980 survey or 1981 update.  The final step was concording the 1980 employee levels, listed
separately by greenfield or acquisition and by revision 2 of the SIC, into the 56 BEA sectors.23
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Figure 1
Skill Premium and Foreign-Affiliate Employment
in U.S. Manufacturing, 1977-1994
Year (4-Digits)
 U.S. Skill Premium  Aff. Share of U.S. Employment










Notes:  Skill premium is measured as the ratio of average annual wages of non-production workers to average annual
wages of production workers in U.S. manufacturing.  Employment share is the share of total U.S. manufacturing
employment accounted for by foreign-owned affiliates operating in the United States.
Sources:  Bureau of Economic Analysis and National Bureau of Economic Research.26
Figure 2
Foreign-Affiliate Payroll, Capital, and Sales
in U.S. Manufacturing, 1977-1994
Year (4-Digits)
 Aff. Share of U.S. Payroll  Aff. Share of U.S. Sales
 Aff. Share of U.S. Capital






Notes:  All activity shares are the share of total U.S. manufacturing activity accounted for by foreign-owned affiliates
operating in the United States.
Sources:  Bureau of Economic Analysis and National Bureau of Economic Research.27
Figure 3
Inward FDI Transaction Counts
in U.S. Manufacturing, 1977-1994
Year (4-Digits)
 NP Transactions  M&A Transactions
 M&A Plus NP Transactions






Notes:  "NP" transactions are new plants, "M&A" transactions are mergers & acquisitions.
Sources:  International Trade Administration.28
Table 1:  Summary Statistics
Variable Measure Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Regressand
U.S. NP Wage Bill / Levels 1008 0.394 0.116
U.S. Wage Bill First Diffs 952 0.003 0.011
Long Diffs 56 0.047 0.042
Regressors
ln (U.S. Plant / Levels 1008 -1.637 0.331
U.S. Shipments) First Diffs 952 -0.013 0.072
Long Diffs 56 -0.221 0.433
ln (U.S. Equipment / Levels 1008 -1.388 0.483
U.S. Shipments) First Diffs 952 0.011 0.077
Long Diffs 56 0.179 0.456
 ln (U.S. Shipments) Levels 1008 10.393 0.854
First Diffs 952 0.019 0.075
Long Diffs 56 0.315 0.611
Computer Investment / Levels 1008 0.044 0.043
Total Investment First Diffs 952 0.003 0.011
Long Diffs 56 0.046 0.033
Affiliate Employment / Levels 864 0.127 0.178
U.S. Employment First Diffs 767 0.007 0.045
Long Diffs 42 0.109 0.139
Affiliate Wage Bill / Levels 859 0.163 0.217
U.S. Wage Bill First Diffs 763 0.010 0.055
Long Diffs 42 0.161 0.190
Affiliate Assets / Levels 860 0.223 0.263
U.S. Capital Stock First Diffs 763 0.022 0.080
Long Diffs 37 0.379 0.368
Affiliate U.S. Shipments / Levels 871 0.108 0.108
U.S. Shipments First Diffs 773 0.007 0.039
Long Diffs 42 0.115 0.114
Jap Affiliate Employment / Levels 112 0.009 0.013
U.S. Employment First Diffs N.A. N.A. N.A.
Long Diffs 56 0.013 0.015
Notes:  All variables defined in the text.  "First Diffs" are one-year differences, "Long Diffs" are full-sample
differences (18 years for all variables except the Japanese variable, which is 10 years).
Sources:  BEA, JEI, NBER, and U.S. Bureau of the Census.29
Table 2:  Skill-Upgrading Regressions:
BEA Data, Short Differences, 1977-1994
Regressor Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of FDI Activity employment wage bill capital shipments
D (FDI Activity) -0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.009
(-0.100) (-0.378) (0.948) (-0.915)
Computerization 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.026
(2.299) (2.345) (2.522) (2.424)
D ln (U.S. Plant / U.S. Ship) 0.098 0.096 0.097 0.094
(4.727) (4.601) (4.588) (4.572)
D ln (U.S. Equip / U.S. Ship) 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.010
(1.189) (1.087) (1.145) (1.250)
D ln (U.S. Shipments) 0.053 0.052 0.052 0.051
(3.091) (2.988) (2.939) (2.981)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.371 0.375 0.400 0.386
# Observations 767 763 763 773
Notes:  Each specification is a variation of equation (2) in the text.  In all cases the regressand is the change in
skilled-labor's share of the wage bill, the wage regressor omitted, and capital disaggregated between plant and
equipment.  Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White robust standard errors.
Sources:  BEA, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and NBER.30
Table 3:  Skill-Upgrading Regressions:
BEA Data, Long Differences, 1977-1994
Regressor Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of FDI Activity employment wage bill capital shipments
D (FDI Activity) 0.007 0.011 -0.001 0.076
(0.134) (0.303) (-0.110) (1.040)
Computerization 0.473 0.480 0.445 0.501
(2.404) (2.463) (3.455) (2.668)
D ln (U.S. Plant / U.S. Ship) 0.054 0.055 0.034 0.061
(2.204) (2.194) (1.693) (2.372)
D ln (U.S. Equip / U.S. Ship) 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.013
(2.164) (2.056) (3.184) (1.468)
D ln (U.S. Shipments) 0.045 0.045 0.016 0.046
(2.231) (2.210) (3.455) (2.668)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.537 0.538 0.584 0.561
# Observations 42 42 37 42
Notes:  Each specification is a variation of equation (2) in the text.  In all cases the regressand is the change in
skilled-labor's share of the wage bill, the wage regressor omitted, and capital disaggregated between plant and
equipment.  Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White robust standard errors.
Sources:  BEA, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and NBER.31
Table 4:  Skill-Upgrading Regressions:
BEA Data, Various Differences and Subperiods
Regressor Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D (FDI Activity) -0.004 -0.150 0.015 0.004
(-0.323) (-0.392) (1.216) (0.085)
Computerization 0.017 0.080 0.055 0.288
(0.773) (0.662) (2.648) (2.215)
D ln (U.S. Plant / U.S. Ship) 0.048 0.054 0.131 0.095
(1.496) (1.355) (2.926) (3.560)
D ln (U.S. Equip / U.S. Ship) 0.006 0.005 0.027 -0.001
(0.865) (1.190) (0.885) (-0.042)
D ln (U.S. Shipments) -0.021 -0.006 0.092 0.072
(-0.615) (-0.229) (3.336) (3.535)
Time Period 1986-1991 1986-1991 1977-1985 1977-1985
Time Differences Short Long Short Long
Adjusted R-Squared 0.149 0.185 0.492 0.563
# Observations 219 47 346 40
Notes:  Each specification is a variation of equation (2) in the text.  In all cases the regressand is the change in
skilled-labor's share of the wage bill, the FDI regressor is in terms of employment, the wage regressor omitted, and
capital disaggregated between plant and equipment.  Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White robust
standard errors.
Sources:  BEA, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and NBER.32
Table 5:  Skill-Upgrading Regressions:
BEA-ITA Data, Short Differences, 1977-1994
Regressor Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of Inward FDI MA JV NP PE MA+NP+PE
D (FDI Activity) 0.001 -0.019 -0.009 -0.009 -0.001
(0.068) (-0.490) (-0.462) (-0.315) (-0.124)
Computerization 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
(2.074) (2.089) (2.047) (2.071) (2.071)
D ln (U.S. Plant / U.S. Ship) 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.102 0.102
(4.671) (4.675) (4.669) (4.676) (4.676)
D ln (U.S. Equip / U.S. Ship) 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(1.123) (1.140) (1.131) (1.128) (1.128)
D ln (U.S. Shipments) 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058
(3.143) (3.144) (3.143) (3.148) (3.146)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368
# Observations 678 678 678 678 678
Notes:  Each specification is a variation of equation (2) in the text.  In all cases the regressand is the change in skilled-labor's
share of the wage bill, the BEA part of the FDI regressor is in terms of employment, the wage regressor omitted, and capital
disaggregated between plant and equipment.  Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White robust standard errors.
"MA" refers to mergers and acquisitions, "JV" joint ventures, "NP" new plants, and "PE plant expansions."
Sources:  BEA, ITA, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and NBER.33
Table 6:  Skill-Upgrading Regressions:
BEA-ITA Data, Long Differences, 1977-1994
Regressor Specification Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of Inward FDI MA JV NP PE MA+NP+PE
D (FDI Activity) -0.170 0.117 0.045 0.123 0.007
(0.098) (0.218) (0.230) (0.499) (0.121)
Computerization 0.461 0.476 0.479 0.492 0.472
(2.375) (2.475) (2.359) (2.512) (2.397)
D ln (U.S. Plant / U.S. Ship) 0.054 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.054
(2.204) (2.149) (2.198) (2.203) (2.207)
D ln (U.S. Equip / U.S. Ship) 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018
(2.152) (2.131) (2.033) (1.997) (2.168)
D ln (U.S. Shipments) 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045
(2.263) (2.160) (2.203) (2.176) (2.230)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.537 0.537 0.537 0.541 0.537
# Observations 42 42 42 42 42
Notes:  Each specification is a variation of equation (2) in the text.  In all cases the regressand is the change in skilled-labor's
share of the wage bill, the BEA part of the FDI regressor is in terms of employment, the wage regressor omitted, and capital
disaggregated between plant and equipment.  Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White robust standard errors.
"MA" refers to mergers and acquisitions, "JV" joint ventures, "NP" new plants, and "PE plant expansions."
Sources:  BEA, ITA, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and NBER.34
Table 7:  Skill-Upgrading Regressions:
JEI Data, Long Differences, 1980-1990
Regressor Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3)
Type of Inward FDI MA NP MA + NP
D (FDI Activity) -0.003 -0.008 -0.007
(-0.632) (-3.285) (-1.619)
Computerization 0.404 0.358 0.411
(3.327) (3.179) (3.816)
D ln (U.S. Plant / U.S. Ship) 0.105 0.098 0.094
(4.039) (3.367) (3.270)
D ln (U.S. Equip / U.S. Ship) 0.012 0.008 0.009
(1.668) (1.440) (1.684)
D ln (U.S. Shipments) 0.061 0.056 0.052
(3.248) (2.793) (2.691)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.660 0.686 0.672
# Observations 56 56 56
Notes:  Each specification is a variation of equation (2) in the text.  In all cases the regressand is the change in
skilled-labor's share of the wage bill, the wage regressor omitted, and capital disaggregated between plant and
equipment.  Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White robust standard errors.  "MA" refers to mergers
and acquisitions, "NP" to new plants.
Sources:  JEI, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and NBER.35
Appendix Table:  The 56 BEA Industries
BEA Industry Name SIC Industries BEA Industry Name SIC Industries
Meat Products 201 Primary Metal Industries, Ferrous 331, 332, 339
Dairy Products 202 Primary Metal Industries, Nonferrous 333 - 336
Fruits & Vegetables 203 Containers, Forgings, & Stampings 341, 346
Grain Mill Products 204 Cutlery, Hand Tools, & Screws 342, 345
Bakery Products 205 Plumbing, Heating, & Structures 343, 344
Beverages 208 Misc. Metal Products 347 - 349
Misc. Food Products 206, 207, 209 Engines & Turbines 351
Tobacco Products 21 Farm & Garden Machinery 352
Textile Mill Products 22 Construction & Mining Machinery 353
Apparel Products 23 Metalworking Machinery 354
Lumber & Wood Products 24 Special Industry Machinery 355
Furniture & Fixtures 25 General Industrial Machinery 356
Pulp, Paper, & Board Mills 261, 262, 263, 266 Office & Computing Machinery 357
Paperboard & Misc. Paper Products 264, 265 Refrigeration & Service Machinery 358
Printing & Publishing 27 Misc. Machinery 359
Industrial Chemicals 281, 282, 286 Household Appliances 363
Drugs 283 Light & Wiring Equipment 364
Soap & Cleaners 284 Radio, TV, & Communication Prods 366
Agricultural Chemicals 287 Electronic Components 367
Paint & Misc. Chemical Products 285, 289 Misc. Electrical Products 369
Integrated Petroleum Products 291 part Motor Vehicles & Equipment 371
Petroleum Refining 291 part Other Transport Equipment 372-379
Petroleum and Coal Products 295, 299 Scientific & Measuring Instruments 381, 382
Rubber Products 301 - 306 Optical & Ophthalmic Goods 383, 385
Misc. Plastic Products 307 Medical Instruments & Supplies 384
Leather Products 31 Photographic Equipment & Supplies 386
Glass Products 321 - 323 Watches, Clocks, & Watchcases 387
Stone & Clay Products 324 - 329 Misc. Manufacturing Industries 39
Note: SIC Codes are for the Standard Industrial Classification, Revision 2 (1972)